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FUNDAMENTALS
WHAT DO CLIENTS WANT? WHAT DO LAWYERS DO?
Lynn Mather*
INTRODUCTION
A serious discussion of "what do clients want?" requires an understanding
of the particular situation clients find themselves in when meeting with their
attorneys. Consideration of emotional and financial stress, the stakes and
complexity of the conflict, relations between opposing parties, a client's view
of law and her lawyer, and differences between ordinary language and the
language of the law are among the many factors that shape the ability of clients
to articulate exactly what they want from their lawyers. Indeed, some clients
do not know what they want and rely instead on their lawyers to tell them what
they should do. Clients may also change their goals during the course of legal
representation. Constructing client goals is a social process throughout which
lawyers influence the defining of issues, the framing of the case, the
formulating of alternatives, as well as many other decisions potentially
affecting the outcome.
To what extent should the lawyer control the client? Should she exercise
independent, objective judgment about the case and attempt to persuade the
client of her view, or should she simply seek to implement the client's
expressed position, so long as it is within the bounds of the law? The question,
more or less, is which role appropriately defines "professional" conduct for
lawyers? Many scholars advocate an independent role,' as evidenced by the
Professor of Law and Political Science and Director of the Baldy Center for Law & Social Policy,
University at Buffalo. Ph.D., University of California at Irvine; B.A., UCLA. I wish to thank participants in
the University at Buffalo Law Faculty Workshop for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); Robert Gordon, The Independence of
Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv.
469 (1984); Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1303 (1995).
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use of terms such as "professional" instead of "agent" when referring to the
role of the lawyer.2 Yet others see lawyer independence not as professional
conduct but as authoritarian manipulation and domineering paternalism, and
argue that professionalism should be defined by a more client-centered
approach.3
What is a good lawyer to do? A consensus does not exist in either the
formal bar rules or the academic literature. Such ambivalence about the
appropriate role for lawyers is not new. As Fred Zacharias has noted, even the
famous English statement of client loyalty (Lord Brougham's admonition that
the lawyer "knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his
client") was qualified by the belief that lawyers would of course also exerciseS 4
their own objective moral judgment. Given the delicate balancing of client
interests and public interests that is required of lawyers, it is not surprising that
both roles have dominated at different points in history. Where one generation
has urged lawyers to serve as partisan advocates for their clients, the next
generation has instead favored the independent advisor role.' In this Article, I
explore what we know about the lawyer-client relationship in different areas of
legal practice in an effort to elucidate the normative debate.
Part I provides a brief review of the central points in the legal academic
literature about what role lawyers should play for their clients. This section
also notes that current rules of professional conduct reflect the scholarly
ambivalence on this issue, since the rules can be read by lawyers to condone
either an independent or a client-centered stance. Part II explores recent work
on professionalism in practice, that is, on the norms that emerge from
communities of lawyers who regularly interact with one another in different
areas of legal practice. This section then summarizes the empirical research
depicting what role lawyers actually play with their clients. As a social
scientist, I believe that good description can lead to better prescription. Hence,
understanding what lawyers do for their clients and why, may help in
2 See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND
MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 142 (1995).
3 See DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED
APPROACH (1977); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DOUGLAS E.
ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974); Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients:
Thinking About Law as Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459 (1989); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34
UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987); Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966).
4 Zacharias, supra note 1, at 1315-16.
5 See id. at 1314-27.
[Vol. 52
WHAT DO CLIENTS WANT? WHAT DO LAWYERS DO?
clarifying and improving normative standards for lawyers' conduct. As Part II
of this Article suggests, significant variation exists across and within legal
specialties in the extent to which attorneys see their role as enacting what
clients want rather than providing independent advice. It is clear that the
"problem" of lawyers riding roughshod over their clients' wishes looks quite
different when the clients are powerful corporations like Microsoft or Lincoln
Savings & Loan rather than individuals facing criminal prosecution, struggling
through a divorce, or seeking compensation for an injury. Part III summarizes
the factors that appear to explain the conditions under which lawyers choose
one of the two professional roles. I conclude with some speculation about
possible responses to variation in lawyers' role by areas of practice and type of
clients.
I. SHOULD LAWYERS GIVE CLIENTS WHAT THEY WANT?
When a lawyer takes a client-centered approach to representation, she is
often castigated for acting as a "hired gun" or "mouthpiece." Yet the ethical
rules of conduct promulgated by the bar support this role. The American Bar
Association's (ABA) Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code) states, for example, that other than in certain minor areas, "the authority
to make decisions is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the
framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.",6 In the
revised guidelines for lawyers, the newer Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules), the ABA states that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation ... and shall consult with
the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued."7 Although the
Model Rules set up what at first glance seems to be a straightforward division
between objectives and means (allowing the client to set the objectives and the
lawyer to determine the means),8 legal academics and the ABA's own
comments underscore how the two often become blurred. As the comment to
this rule acknowledges, a "clear distinction between objectives and means
sometimes cannot be drawn ... ."9 As a result, support for the client-centered
approach from the ethical rules is weaker than it initially appears.
6 MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7.
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
8 For a summary of commentary finding the distinction between ends and means to be unhelpful, see
Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decisionmaking Between Defense Counsel and
Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decisionmaking, 47 KAN. L. REV. 1, n.55 (1998).
9 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt.
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Other language in the rules suggests that lawyers should follow a more
lawyer-centered role in representation. The Model Rules state that "a lawyer
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice."'0
The Model Rules also allow a lawyer to withdraw from representation if "a
client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or
imprudent."" These statements certainly encourage lawyer independence and
challenge a client-centered approach. One can meticulously go through the
rules searching for guidance and come up empty-handed. The rules
themselves are vague, contradictory, and ambiguous and thus do not tell
lawyers how, as professionals, they should behave in representing clients. 2
Ambiguity in the ethical rules mirrors the ambivalence and debate in the
academic literature over the appropriate role for lawyers. A traditional
argument in favor of lawyers acting as faithful agents for their clients rests on
the nature of the adversary system. In a system with third-party adjudication,
each side must have a partisan advocate who will nonjudgmentally argue its
position. According to this "standard"' 3 view of legal representation, a lawyer
should not judge her own client, but rather should advocate and defend the
client's objectives. Judging is the job of the judge. The job of the lawyer is to
advocate zealously for her client regardless of whether the client's goals are
realistic or worthy. 14 As one scholar has noted, "it is not only legally but also
morally right that a lawyer adopt as his dominant purpose the furthering of his
client's interests-that it is right that a professional put the interests of his
client above some idea, however valid, of the collective interest."' 5
A more recent argument in favor of lawyer deference to clients rests on the
importance of client autonomy and self-determination. Thus, "a client-
centered practice takes the principle of client decision-making seriously," and
'o Id. R. 2. 1.
'' Id.R. 1.16(b)(3).
12 See, e.g., PAUL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE As THEY Do 86 (arguing that "the professional
rules permit the lawyer to practice in accordance with the hired gun model or the independent lawyer model, as
he chooses"); Uphoff & Wood, supra note 8, at 15 (arguing that vagueness and inconsistencies in the Model
Rules "leave the lawyer basically free to decide this question as she sees fit"). For a broader critique of the
professional rules as effective guides to lawyers' conduct, see, for example, Heidi Li Feldman, Codes And
Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (1996); David B. Wilkins,
Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990).
13 LUBAN, supra note 3, at 393.
14 Freedman, supra note 3.
15 Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976).
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encourages lawyers to act in ways that will maximize client autonomy.16
Lawyers should help clients make their own decisions, not by overpowering
them with authority and technical expertise, but by engaging in sensitive client
interviewing to provide support and any necessary information to enable
clients to make their own decisions. A "participatory" model of the lawyer-
client relationship depicts clients as actively involved in decisions about legal
strategy, evaluation of alternatives, and final case disposition." Douglas
Rosenthal suggests that active client participation will reduce conflicts of
interest between client and lawyer, increase client satisfaction, and ultimately
produce a better case outcome for the client. 8 Besides its ultimate benefit to
the client, this kind of lawyer-client relationship would also strengthen the role
of law in society. Empowering clients to speak in their own words and to
express their own interests should make law itself more responsive to litigants'
experiences. 9
If we think of a continuum-between complete client control over
decisionmaking at one end and lawyer control at the other-a client-centered
practice or participatory model might be somewhere in the middle, yet closer
to the client end. Stephen Ellmann, for example, defends client-centered
lawyering but admits that some situations require lawyers to exercise
considerable power over clients to achieve the overall goal of client
autonomy. ° Despite disagreements among scholars favoring greater client
participation on exactly what role lawyers should play in decisionmaking and
why, they share a general distrust of lawyers' control over clients.
To other scholars, however, the independent judgment of lawyers is
precisely what they must provide their clients if they are to act as
professionals. If the client is always right, then lawyers are not exercising the
professional authority and expertise that defines their role." Lawyers should
apply their own engaged moral judgment to their client's problems and should
acknowledge the alternative values that may conflict with their clients'
wishes.22 Another problem with a client-oriented perspective on lawyering is
16 Ellmann, supra note 3, at 720. See also BINDER & PRICE, supra note 3.
17 ROSENTHAL, supra note 3.
18 Id.
19 See Cunningham, supra note 3, at 2493.
20 Ellmann, supra note 3. But see John K. Morris, Power and Responsibility Among Lawyers and
Clients: Comment on Ellmann's Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 781 (1987) (criticizing Ellmann's
view).
21 See ELIOT FRIEDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY, PROPHECY AND POLICY (1994).
22 See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 3; Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55
2003]
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that client interests are not predetermined and fixed, but are shaped and
constructed through the social interaction between client and lawyer. Even the
ostensibly simple process of rephrasing client objectives into the language of
law adds new meaning to the client's position.23 The indeterminacy of client
goals and the malleability of legal language suggest that lawyers cannot avoid
exercising independent influence over clients. 4 Additional support for
lawyers' independence comes from Robert Gordon's argument that such a role
is better for society, not just for clients' interests. Since lawyers'
discretionary decisions necessarily entail making political judgments, they
should remain independent from their clients in order to fulfill the ideal of law
26as a public profession.
Nevertheless, the basis for lawyers' "independent judgment" remains
problematic. Does it mean that lawyers should pursue exactly what the written
law requires? Or what they believe the judge or jury would do? Or what they
personally believe is the ideal moral course to take? Or what they believe to be
in their client's best interest? The very notion of "representation" entails the
quite different meanings of the Burkean trustee (do what you think is best) and
the delegate (do what you are asked to do).
In short, neither the rules of the bar nor the academic literature provide a
clear answer to the question of what role lawyers should play in representing
their clients. Perhaps lawyers, implicitly understanding this uncertainty,
decide on their own whether to be agents for clients or independent
advisors-with great individual variation in the choices made and no particular
pattern as a result. But that seems not to be the case. An emerging literature
focusing on lawyers' ideologies and practices suggests that they develop
standards of professionalism in concert with one another. That is to say,
lawyers articulate and share particular norms of professional conduct through
daily interactions with their peers-through "communities of practice,"27
N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, (1980); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589
(1985).
23 Lynn Mather & Barbara Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 775 (1980-81).
24 See Gordon, supra note 1; Simon, supra note 1.
25 See Gordon, supra note 1.
26 See id.
27 LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE
(2001). See also JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS
(1971); JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); Christine B. Harrington, Outlining a Theory of Legal Practice, in LAWYERS IN A
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"arenas of professionalism,, 21 "local legal cultures,, 29 or through the "culture
. . . of practice organizations."'0  Instead of thinking of professionals as
autonomous individuals each developing her own approach to clients,
professional decisionmaking should be understood in its social and
organizational context. Viewed in context, one can see that lawyers create
professional roles for client representation according to, for example, the
nature of the client, the area of law practice, and the organizational setting of
practice. Commonalities emerge, in short, from lawyers who handle similar
clienteles, who do similar kinds of legal work, and/or who practice in
organizations together. This explains Robert Gordon and William Simon's
wry comment that, "[i]t is striking that the people who find the claims of
professionalism most convincing are the professionals themselves."'" Lawyers
believe in the claims because they have in effect constructed them out of the
demands of their practice, the nature of their workplace, and the various
ambiguous expectations of the bar and the legal academy.
II. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON LAWYERS AND CLIENTS
Sociological studies of lawyers have been heavily skewed toward those
who deal with individual clients such as criminal defendants, divorce litigants,
or personal injury plaintiffs. Scholars have also examined lawyer-client
interactions in various law reform campaigns such as civil rights and disability
rights. In contrast to these practice areas, systematic studies of corporate
lawyers are rare. In this Part, I summarize the empirical research on different
types of lawyers, paying particular attention to the reasons suggested for their
different approaches to clients. Much of the work purports to assess the
lawyer-client relationship or to describe lawyer-client negotiations, but in fact
nearly all of the research relies on observations or interviews only with the
lawyer, not the client."
POSTMODERN WORLD: TRANSLATION AND TRANSGRESSION (Maureen Cain & Christine B. Harrington eds.,
1994); Wilkins, supra note 12.
28 Robert R. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of
Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES Ch. 5, 177-214 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992).
29 Thomas W. Church, Jr., Eramining Local Legal Culture, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 449,450.
30 MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF PRACTICE (1994).
31 Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES supra note 28, at 233, 230-58.
32 For exceptions to this, see JONATHAN D. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENDANT'S
PERSPECTIVE (1972) (analyzing interviews with criminal defendants); SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 2
(analyzing taped office conversations between divorce lawyers and their clients).
2003]
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A. Criminal Defense Lawyers
In a well-known 1967 article, Abraham Blumberg portrayed private
criminal lawyers as engaged in a "confidence game" in which they sold their
clients out by avoiding trials and convincing clients to accept plea bargains in
order to meet the organizational demands of the court in processing heavy
caseloads.33 Further research, however, presented a more complex view of
defense lawyers, showing, for example, that although most lawyers adopted a
cooperative relationship with prosecutors it was not because of caseload14
pressures. Rather, lawyers sought the predictability that resulted from
negotiated settlements and outcomes that they believed to be in their clients'
best interests. Defense attorneys shared a worldview based upon their
experience that the vast majority of their clients were factually guilty with little
chance of an acquittal. In such situations most lawyers concluded that they
should attempt to negotiate for a reduced charge and/or a lesser punishment.
The challenge then became one of "client control," a process of persuading
clients that they should trust the advice of their lawyers and accept the
recommendation about the benefits of a plea bargain. On this point, private
defense attorneys had the built-in advantage that they had been selected by
their client and the client had paid for their service. By contrast, public
defenders-regardless of how committed and competent-faced their clients'
distrust (or even hostility) because there was no payment from the client and,
even worse, the public defenders' salary came from the same coffers as the
prosecutors.
Numerous studies compared the behavior of private attorneys and public
defenders (or legal aid attorneys) in an effort to ascertain who fought harder for
36their clients and most found little or no difference between them. Explicit in
33 Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law As a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAW & SOC'Y REv., June 1967, at 15.
34 See, e.g., MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT (1979); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1978); LYNN M. MATHER, PLEA BARGAINING OR TRIAL? THE PROCESS
OF CRIMINAL-CASE DISPOSITION (1979); DAVID W. NEUBAUER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERICA
(1974).
35 Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52 (1967).
36 See, e.g., MATHER, supra note 34, at 139-48 (summarizing literature). Clientele differences between
public and private counsel explain a good deal of any aggregate variation found since public defenders
disproportionately represent defendants charged with more serious crimes and having more severe prior
criminal records. Defendants charged with serious crimes or having poor records faced more difficulties in
obtaining lenient dispositions in plea bargaining. Roy B. Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney
Perspectives on Their Relations with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 253, 266.
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some of this research is analysis of the role defense attorneys take toward their
clients in decisionmaking. Defense attorneys most often articulated a
professional role of independent advisor rather than agent for their client,
advising clients to accept a plea bargain rather than seek trial. As one public
defender said, "There's too much risk involved to take [some of] these cases to
trial. . . . We'd like to do jury trials. But that's not what's best for our
clients."" Other research questioned whether the lawyers were pursuing what
was best for their clients or what was best for themselves. In particular, their
fees could affect the role private attorneys played because most criminal work
was done on a "flat fee" basis, providing an incentive for lawyers to process
cases quickly through guilty pleas. Additionally, defendants often perceived
public defenders or legal aid lawyers to be acting not in their clients' interests
but in the interests of smooth working relations with the state.
Regardless of the reasons for their independent role, defense attorneys still
faced the task of persuading their clients to accept the attorney's
recommendations. On this point, research found considerable variation
between lawyers. Private criminal attorneys tended to dominate their clients,
strongly urging them to accept their advice. This professional role was
reinforced by the fact that clients initially selected the attorney and were
paying for the advice, and also by the attorney's ability to withdraw from
representation or tell his client to find another lawyer. As an attorney in a
Midwestern city explained, "In private .cases, I will lean on him [the
defendant]. That is the difference that comes out in a private case. If he
doesn't like the advice, it's sure easy enough to hire somebody else."'3 9
Public defenders (PDs) faced more skeptical clients than did private
counsel, and public defenders could not easily withdraw from a case. Their
response to these constraints seemed to vary by court and, to an extent, by
individual. A 1979 study of public defenders in Los Angeles found that the
vast majority, like their colleagues in private practice, strongly urged their
clients to follow their advice. As one typical PD said, "Yeah, I'll twist arms
.... My job is to do what I can for my client. If you've got a bad case and it's
a loser, then it's not worth the risks of trial. You've gotta come down hard on
a client sometimes. ' 4°
37 MATHER, supra note 34, at 123.
38 CASPER, supra note 32.
39 Flemming, supra note 36, at 266.
40 MATHER, supra note 34, at 123-24.
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However, a small group of public defenders in Los Angeles said that they
refused to "twist arms." They were more willing to let their clients set the
strategy, not from a belief in client-centered practice or client empowerment,
but from exasperation with their clients and the sharp social distance between
lawyer and client. A maverick PD in Los Angeles explained:
I can't talk to these clients-it's frustrating and you never really do
get through to them. So if they want their jury trial, then OK, I'll
give it to them. I prefer to deal with the people of the court-I'd
rather talk and argue my case with reasonable people in court, instead
of arguing with my clients.4'
The Midwestern public defenders studied by Roy Flemming generally agreed
with this view. "I'm not gonna twist an arm," one Midwestern PD said.42 And
another explained:
It used to be I would argue with a client on why he should take the
plea. Now, somewhat to his disadvantage, I have said, "Screw him."
... I'm not gonna fight with him and tell him he's gonna plead.
Because over and over again you see cases in which the defendant is
appealing.43
Other public defenders in Flemming's study took on a collaborative role,
indirectly advising clients, involving them in discussions, and letting them
make the key decisions.
A recent survey of PDs in five large urban offices also found variation in
lawyers' beliefs and practices regarding client involvement in decisionmaking.
Most public defense lawyers thought that they should control both strategy and
tactics "even in the face of the defendant's contrary opinion or explicit
objection." Yet lawyers' support for independence depended on the strategic
issue involved and it varied considerably by office location.
Interestingly-and giving credence to the power of institutional culture over
time-the public defenders surveyed in Los Angeles gave the strongest
endorsement to an independent professional role and were "less committed to a
client-centered approach to decisionmaking than their counterparts in the other
four public defender offices., 45 Other factors that public defenders cited as
important influences on their willingness to share decisionmaking with clients
41 Id. at 124-25.
42 Flemming, supra note 36, at 264.
41 Id. at 265.
44 Uphoff & Wood, supra note 8, at 59.
41 Id. at 58.
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included a belief that the client would make a poor decision and a general
perception of criminal clients' low intelligence.46
Thus, although most criminal defense lawyers saw themselves as directing
their clients rather than the reverse, attorneys varied in their commitment to
this position. Private attorneys held to it more consistently, while public
defenders varied individually and across offices.
B. Divorce Lawyers
Like the criminal defense bar, most divorce lawyers see themselves as in
charge of the case. They take the view that, as one attorney put it, they are
"expensive taxi drivers" in which "the passenger decides on the destination and
I decide on the route., 4' But, also similar to defense attorneys, a small
minority of the divorce bar takes a more client-oriented view to representation.
Divorce lawyers pointed to their clients' emotional state to explain why
meaningful client participation in the divorce process was often difficult to
sustain. Howard Erlanger et al. found some divorce clients unable to assert
themselves due to "their shock or reluctance over the divorce. 49  Other
research cited lawyers whose clients were so full of anger and blame that they
were unable to think "realistically" about their case options, or whose clients
were so agitated or depressed that they could not focus on case discussions.
A client's vulnerability could lead even the most client-centered divorce
lawyer to become more directive and controlling. Further, researchers have
46 See id. at 55. Contrary to the authors' expectations, PDs surveyed in this study did not believe that
high caseloads, time pressures, client mistrust, or their court-appointed status were important factors affecting
their clients' participation in decision making. See id. at 54.
47 See, e.g., MATHER ET AL., supra note 27; HUBERT J. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL
CASES: A STUDY OF INFORMAL PRESSURES IN PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (1963); Howard S. Erlanger
et al., Participation and Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 L. & Soc'Y
REV. 585 (1987); John Griffiths, What Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do in Divorce Cases?, 20 L. & SOC'Y REV.
135 (1986); see also JOHN EEKELAAR Er AL., FAMILY LAWYERS: THE DIVORCE WORK OF SOLICITORS (2000)
(reaching similar conclusions about family lawyers in the UK); RICHARD INGLEBY, SOLICITORS AND DIVORCE
(1992). But see SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 2 (for a slightly different view in which power between
lawyer and client shifts and alternates throughout the case).
48 Lynn Mather et al., "The Passenger Decides on the Destination and I Decide on the Route": Are
Divorce Lawyers "Expensive Cab Drivers?" 9 INT'L J.L. & FAM. 286, 286 (1995).
49 Erlanger et al., supra note 47, at 601.
50 See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 2, at 54; MATHER ET AL., supra note 27, at 91-92; see also
Kenneth Kressel et al., A Provisional Typology of Lawyer Attitudes Towards Divorce Practice: Gladiators,
Advocates, Counselors, and Journeymen, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1983) (finding some variation in divorce
attorneys according to their perceptions of clients as problems because of their emotional instability,
unrealistic expectations, or inability to make good decisions).
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noted the miscommunication between clients who focus on the social and
emotional aspects of the divorce and their lawyers who seek to focus on the
legal aspects. In the era of fault-based divorce, lawyers transformed failing
marriages into one-sided conflicts with fault and transgression on one side.5
Now, in a predominantly no-fault era, lawyers attempt to construct legal
divorces without laying blame, but their clients may still talk in terms of who
was responsible for the break-up. Teaching clients to have "realistic"
expectations, to understand the requirements of the law, and to accept a
"reasonable" settlement is a process that has encouraged divorce lawyers to
act as independent advisors. One attorney explained, "[i]t's not that you're
telling them what to do but telling them that the positions that they are taking
are unreasonable and unsupportable."52
Experience with the long-term consequences of divorce, particularly the
impact of an acrimonious divorce on children, has provided another reason for
many divorce lawyers to reject the hired gun role. The lawyer becomes an
objective advisor in order to protect the third party interest of children or to
further the long-term interest of the client in the role of parent. Although
divorce attorneys were likely to explain their approach to client representation
in terms of promoting a settlement that was "best for the client" or was "what
the law requires," some lawyers also acknowledged their own interest in not
appearing "unreasonable" to their peers or to the court. The need to have a
cooperative, reasonable reputation acted as an additional factor influencing
lawyers to exercise some control over divorce clients. 3
Although divorce lawyers preferred to be in the driver's seat for most
cases, there were significant exceptions to this norm. First, a small number of
divorce attorneys self-identified (or were identified by their peers) as hired
guns proudly advertising their fidelity to their clients' wishes. 4 Second,
insistent clients with substantial resources could sometimes convince even the
most independent-minded attorney to represent them the way that they would
like. Third, analysis of taped office conversations between clients and lawyers
51 See O'GORMAN, supra note 47.
52 MATHER ET AL., supra note 27, at 108.
53 See MATHER ET AL., supra note 27; Erlanger et al., supra note 47, at 593; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert
H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 509, 527 (1994).
54 See. MATHER ET AL., supra note 27; Erlanger et al., supra note 47, at 593; Gilson & Mnookin, supra
note 53, at 509, 527.
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found that the distribution of power between them was constantly changing
and that clients often resisted the advice of counsel.55
C. Personal Injury Plaintiff's Lawyers
Douglas Rosenthal's 1974 book on personal injury claims laid the
groundwork for much of the empirical research cited above. 6 Entitled Lawyer
and Client: Who's in Charge? the study sought to test the assumptions of the
traditional model of the lawyer's role, and compare it to a model of client
participation in decisionmaking. Personal injury lawyers generally followed
the traditional role of dominant decision maker, but some clients were more
active than others in asserting their interests and becoming involved in the
process. Rosenthal compared the extent of client participation with case
outcome (measured independently) and found that active client participation
was associated with better case outcomes, a result contrary to the expectations
of the traditional model that clients would be better off by passively delegating
responsibility to their lawyers.57 Further, the contingent fee system, contrary to
popular belief, created inherent conflicts between the lawyer (who could
maximize income with quicker turnover of cases) and client (who could gain
more by waiting for trial). Increasing client participation in decisionmaking,
Rosenthal argued, could provide a check on lawyers' pursuit of their own self-
interest as well as allowing clients greater influence over case outcomes that
they (and not their lawyers) would have to live with.58
A study of contingency fee lawyers nearly twenty-five years later also
found that they exercised "considerable control over their clients in the
settlement process."5 9  The lawyers set expectations for their clients,
emphasized uncertainty in the process, prepared clients with what to expect in
settlement, and used various strategies to sell the settlement to the client.
However, the lawyers were not entirely in the driver's seat because of other
constraints. Most importantly, success for a contingency fee lawyer did not
rest on a single short-term payoff but depended upon longer-term issues of
reputation. An attorney who sold out too quickly to get the immediate reward
would risk her bargaining credibility with insurance adjustors and opponents in
55 See SARAT & FELSTINER, supra note 2.
56 ROSENTHAL, supra note 3.
57 See id. at ch. 2.
58 See id.
59 Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingent-Fee Lawyers and Their Clients: Settlement Expectations, Settlement
Realities, and Issues of Control in the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 23 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 795, 812 (1998).
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future cases. Lawyers were also concerned about the reputation they left with
their clients at the conclusion of a case. Plaintiff lawyers depend heavily upon
client referrals and word of mouth for their business, so satisfied clients can
help lawyers by bringing new clients to them.6°
D. Poverty and Civil Rights Lawyers
Legal services lawyers, like those in criminal law, have a high volume
practice and typically face a large social distance between themselves and their
clients. Studies of lawyer-client relations in areas of poverty law (e.g.,
housing, welfare, consumer problems) have observed lawyers generally taking
charge of clients' cases. Indeed, scholarly critics of lawyer dominance such as
Gerald Lopez,6 ' Anthony Alfieri, 62 and Lucie White draw explicitly on
examples from poverty law to develop their arguments for changing the way
lawyers practice. Traditional legal practice, these critics argue, simply
strengthens power differentials between lawyer and client and encourages
passivity and dependence in the poor. Carl Hosticka's systematic observations
of lawyer-client negotiations in a legal services office certainly support this
critique.64 Using sociolinguistic methods, he found that poverty lawyers
dominated conversations with clients through control over topic and timing.
By controlling the clients' problem definitions, lawyers could routinize cases
into set categories for easier disposition. The cost of this approach was "to
ignore differences in detail and preferences between clients''65 and to
communicate to clients how little the system cares about them as individuals. 66
60 See id. at 813-15; see also STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, THAT'S 95% OF THE GAME, JUST
GETTING THE CASE: MARKETS, NORMS, AND How TEXAS PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS GET CLIENTS (Am. B. Found.
Working Paper No. 9722, 1997). For additional data on the importance of referrals in the plaintiff personal
injury bar, see Sara Parikh, Professionalism and its Discontents: A Study of Social Networks in the Plaintiffs
Personal Injury Bar (2001) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Chicago).
61 GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE
(1992).
62 Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstuctive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100
YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
63 Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of
Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. I (1990).
64 Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care What Happened, We Only Care About What Is Going to Happen:
Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 SOc. PROBS. 599, 607 (1979).
65 Id. at 607.
66 ld.at609-10.
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Ann Southworth's recent study of legal services and law school clinic
lawyers similarly reported very little client participation.67  Lawyers she
interviewed explained that their clients were "unsophisticated," "had no idea
what to do," or simply expected the lawyers to take charge." Other lawyers in
Southworth's research worked for advocacy organizations and they too
described the substantial direction they exercised in cases, partially due to their
interest in long term law development. Like their peers in legal services,
lawyers for advocacy organizations have also been attacked for defining and
waging, through the courts, what are essentially political agendas on behalf of
disadvantaged minorities without allowing meaningful client input. Lawyers
for the NAACP during the campaign for school desegregation have been used
69as examples of lawyers exerting control over case strategy and tactics. Since
then, social reform litigation has become widespread and rights consciousness
among consumers has increased. Susan Olson's 1984 research on disability
rights litigation revealed a collaborative process in all five of the law reform
cases she studied, with active client participation in the formulation of case
strategy.7° Disabled clients asserted themselves in the litigation process as part
of their emphasis on autonomy and self-help. 7' The disability rights groups
Olson examined were already organized at the outset of litigation, which also
facilitated the group leaders' active involvement with their lawyers.
72
Attorneys who worked in small civil rights firms or business lawyers from
large firms who represented nonprofit organizations as part of their public
service expressed far more deferential views toward their clients than those in
the legal service programs discussed above.73 For instance, the business
lawyers interviewed by Southworth said that they rarely made strategy
decisions without consulting with their clients (who were nonprofit
organizations), and that they preferred to explain the legal options and let
clients choose among them.74 Some attorneys qualified this view, however, by
noting that their role depended in large part on "the sophistication of their
67 Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An Empirical
Study of Lawyers' Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101 (1996).
68 Id. at 1112 (quoting remarks of legal services lawyers interviewed by author).
69 See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
70 SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984).
71 Id. at 161.
72 Id. at 161-62.
73 Southworth, supra note 67, at 1120-22.
74 Id. at 1121.
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clients."75 The contrast found between the lawyers' norms in legal service
organizations and those in the private firms could be due to differences in the
social distance between lawyer and client or to the legal culture of workplace
itself.
E. Corporate Lawyers
Unlike most of the lawyers discussed thus far who represented individual
clients, attorneys retained by large businesses or corporations occupy a quite
different segment of the profession. As John Heinz and Edward Laumann
have shown, lawyers working on personal plight cases or personal business
issues share little in common with those working on cases for the corporate
sector. 7' The differences in background, demographics, working conditions,
pay, and prestige in the two sectors extend to the relations between clients and
lawyers. Lawyers representing business and organizational clients identify
77with them and defer to them in decisionmaking. Paradoxically, then, as
Richard Abel notes, "lawyers at the bottom of the professional hierarchy are
the most autonomous."" Or, to put this as Joel Handler does, "Strong, rich and
confident clients direct their lawyers . . . lawyers dominate the relationship
when clients are poor, deviant, or unsophisticated.,
79
Robert Nelson's interviews with over two hundred lawyers in large
Chicago law firms revealed how closely attorneys identified with their clients
and how dependent upon them they were. When asked how much of their time
was spent on just one client, lawyers at one firm said it was nearly fifty
percent, with an average of more than one-third across the interview sample.s
Rarely did the lawyers see a conflict between their personal values and what
they were asked to do by their clients. Additionally, the notion of professional
"5 ld. at 1122.
76 JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRuCruRE OF THE BAR
(1982). See also John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and 1995,
32 LAW. & SOC'Y REV. 751 (1998) (updating their analysis of differentiation within the Chicago bar).
77 HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 73.
78 Richard L. Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 15 (Richard L. Abel &
Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995). Interestingly, such decline in lawyers' autonomy characterized the nineteenth-
century bar as well. See, e.g., I THE PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER: LEGAL PAPERS (Alfred S. Konefsky &
Andrew J. King eds., 1982) (noting the change from Daniel Webster's independent role in rural practice to the
more limited discretion and agency role he played when representing the mercantile-industrial elites.).
79 JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 25 (1978).
80 Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client
Relationships i, the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 529 (1985).
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autonomy made no sense in the course of their daily practice. Robert Kagan's
and Robert Eli Rosen's study of lawyers in large firms found the same picture
of lawyers as agents for their clients." One section of their article is entitled,
"Why The Lawyer-As-Influential-and-Independent-Counselor Role is Likely
to Be Extraordinary Rather than Ordinary." 2  The large businesses and
corporations acting in their client role simply did not want influence or
direction from a lawyer; rather they sought a "conduit" or perhaps an "insurer."
Thus, attorneys in large law finms reported that they rarely acted as influential
and independent counselors for their clients.
If a corporation's attorney were to offer independent advice to her client
and try to "lean" on the client to accept it-similar to the approach of the
public defender or divorce lawyer-the result would be obvious and swift: the
business would seek another attorney. Competition for corporate business thus
discourages client-influencing behavior." Eve Spangler's research on large-
firm lawyers in New England provides further evidence for this point. For
example, she cites one corporate attorney (who had previously worked in legal
services and civil liberties) about the differences between these areas of
practice:
I think Legal Services people see an issue, want to represent that
issue. On the other hand, when you're involved in this type of
practice, you are a tool of your client. You're part of his team-
you're there to advise the client, structure the deal, whatever, but
you're still doing it within what his goals are.84
One consequence of lawyer deference to business clients lies in the periodic
scandals of corporate wrongdoing. Such episodes should not be surprising
given the difficult situation in which business lawyers are placed. Thinking
about the differences between representation of corporate and individual
clients raises other issues for considering "what do clients want?" The client-
sensitive or agent role in representation could become the role of the lackey in
situations of unequal power between client and lawyer. As a result, the
broader public interest, including the requirements of the law, may suffer.
81 Robert A. Kagan & Robert Eli Rosen, On the Social Significance of Large Law Firm Practice, 37
STAN. L. REV. 399 (1985).
82 Id. at 422.
83 KELLY, supra note 30, at 212. See also supra notes 77-82.
84 EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 64 (1986).
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III. FACTORS EXPLAINING LAWYERS' ROLES
As this brief survey has shown, lawyers' approaches to client
representation vary considerably by areas of practice and type of client. 5
Within specific legal fields lawyers generally share an understanding of the
appropriateness and value of their particular way of working with their clients.
Yet the exceptions in each area of practice and the variation across them also
reveal important insights about lawyers' professional roles. This Part draws on
the data presented above and also on the work of other scholars who have
studied lawyers' approaches to their clients. Most importantly, lawyers'
decisions to control their clients or to cede control seem to be based less on
86formal legal principles and more on economic and social factors.
Just like other workers, lawyers appear to respond to economic incentives
in the course of their work. Thus, client resources and fee structure influence
lawyers' approach to representation. A single or flat case fee encourages
private criminal defense attorneys to minimize time on a case and to dominate
their clients. Personal injury lawyers, who are paid on a contingency fee, also
benefit from a quick turnover of cases and tend to exercise considerable client
control. By contrast, business lawyers, who bill by the hour, typically allow
their clients to set the agenda and pace of work. Comparison of lawyers
representing poverty and civil rights claims found that, with some exception,
"lawyers who were dependent upon their clients for their salaries generally
expressed more deferential views than did lawyers whose payment came from
other sources."'" Exceptions to these patterns in criminal practice or divorce
work frequently came from clients with substantial resources. Clients with
deep pockets could more easily resist their lawyers' control and, if they chose
to, direct case strategies themselves.
85 Other important areas of practice and types of client to consider include inside counsel, lawyers who
work for governments such as prosecutors and attorney generals, and lawyers in solo or small firm general
practices. Maureen Cain's 1979 research on solicitors in Britain is the classic study of general practice
lawyers acting as agents of their clients. Maureen Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client:
Towards a Radical Conception, 7 INT'L J. Soc. L. 331 (1979) (finding that most lawyers translated their
clients' objectives rather than controlling their clients by refusing to translate or substituting their own views).
86 See OLSON, supra note 70; Southworth, supra note 67 (summarizing facts from empirical research);
see also Gordon, supra note I; Zacharias, supra note 1.
87 Southworth, supra note 67, at 1124. See also HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 76 (reporting a
relationship between degree of professional control and clients' control over lawyers' payment); Abel, supra
note 78 (arguing that lawyers behave in ways to get clients to pay the bills).
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The relationship between lawyer and client also explains why some
lawyers exercise greater control over clients than others do. Lawyers in high
volume practices, such as criminal defense or divorce work, do not depend on
any particular client for a significant source of their income. This provides the
lawyer with leverage to part ways with clients who resist her advice. On the
other hand, corporate lawyers whose annual income depends heavily on one or
two clients may have difficulty exerting substantial influence over them. As
the saying goes, "you can't be a good lawyer with just one client." That is to
say, professional independence and objectivity are threatened by a lawyer's
economic reliance on her client. Furthermore, as Marc Galanter has shown,
clients who are "repeat players," regularly using the courts, show less
deference to their lawyers than "one shotters" who use the courts
infrequently." But repeat player clients who regularly work with the same
lawyers over time willingly cede control to them and rely on them for advice.
As one senior partner in a large law firm explained, "business clients with
whom I have had a relationship over a long period of time do look to me for
independent business advice as well as for legal counsel."89 Thus, lack of a
working relationship between lawyer and client, or an imbalance of power
between them, affects how lawyers approach the task of client representation.
How lawyers represent their clients also depends upon the organizational
context of lawyers' work. Law firms and other legal organizations develop
shared cultures or house norms that profoundly affect how a lawyer practices,
including her approach to clients. 90 As discussed earlier, the office cultures of
different public defender organizations varied along numerous dimensions,
including the allocation of decision-making responsibility between public
defenders and their clients. 9' Informal communities of legal practice develop
around certain legal specialties (e.g., divorce, personal injury) and in small
towns and cities where lawyers repeatedly work with one another. These
communities provide another type of organizational context that shapes
lawyers' actions. Thus, particular norms of client representation develop and
influence lawyers in those communities to behave accordingly in order to
maintain their reputations. For example, as discussed earlier, most divorce
88 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
89 Quoted in Kagan & Rosen, supra note 81, at 427.
90 KELLY, supra note 30, at 18.
91 Uphoff & Wood, supra note 8.
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attorneys value reasonableness and pride themselves on educating their clients
to have realistic expectations.92
Variation in the characteristics of individual clients sheds further light on
why lawyers choose different professional roles. Lawyers who exercised
considerable client control often referred to the characteristics of their clients
to justify or explain the need for the attorney's influence. Criminal defense
lawyers con-mented on their clients' lack of intelligence; divorce lawyers
emphasized their clients' emotional instability and self-absorption; and legal
services attorneys pointed to their clients' lack of sophistication. On the other
hand, corporate lawyers pointed to their business clients' extensive knowledge
and sophistication to justify a collaborative style or attorney deference to
client. Variation in the personality or demographics of lawyers has also been
suggested to explain different approaches to client representation, but little
systematic evidence exists to support this point.93 Other factors might also
explain differences in the degree of independent judgment and influence
lawyers exercise over clients. These include: the nature of the problem and the
available legal remedies; the type of legal work performed (e.g., litigation,
transactional, organization, counseling, etc.); the degree of uncertainty and the
clients' willingness to accept risk; political goals for lawyers and client; and
any external controls over lawyer-client interactions (e.g., governmental
regulation, ethics supervision within a law firm or company, appellate
processes, or insurance systems).
CONCLUSION
The power of these factors to shape lawyers' professional ideology and
practice suggests that reform will be difficult, even if we agreed on the
direction to take to improve how lawyers act with their clients. I conclude with
some tentative suggestions.
e Professional rules of conduct should acknowledge the differentiated
and stratified nature of the profession, and bar committees should
stop writing vague "one-size-fits-all" rules that fit no one. Current
admonitions about what lawyers should do with their clients
generally ignore the practice setting of the lawyer, the nature of the
92 See sources cited supra note 53.
93 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 70, at 136-39. It would be interesting to look for any commonalities in
the personality or demographics of graduating law students as they select their different areas of legal practice.
That is, can any of the differences in professional role by area of practice be explained by self-selection?
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legal problem, and the power differential between lawyer and client.
David Wilkins's suggestion of middle-range legal principles for
various segments of the profession may have some met.4
Currently, some bar rules do impose different obligations on
lawyers according to their area of practice, for example, the
prohibition on sexual relations between lawyer and client during
representation of domestic relations issues, but not for other areas of
practice.95 The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers has its
own set of professional guidelines, which specifically recognize the. . ... 96
particularities of divorce law practice, as do other specialties.
Research on the impact of these guidelines would be useful.
" Since one kind of abuse of the lawyer's role as client advocate
occurs at the behest of clients who are more powerful than their
lawyer, we might address the power of the law firm over individual
lawyers. To the extent that it exists, professionalism in practice
does not reside in each lone individual lawyer, but in the social
community in which each lawyer practices. For lawyers in firms,
that community is the law firm organization, with its formal policies
on billing hours and its hierarchy, and its informal understandings
reinforced daily at the water cooler. The development of "entity"
discipline, the ability to sanction law firms, is occurring through
broader workplace policy (such as sexual harassment for which the
entire firm is liable). Here, too, research should be done on the
effectiveness of such policies.
" Both ideas above rest on formal discipline within the profession-
rules, enforcement bodies, and sanctions. Yet these are notoriously
ineffective measures when compared with the power of social
forces, organizational culture, and economic self-interest. Surely
there must be an alternative way to monitor professional conduct
besides formal rules. Since it is through practice that new lawyers
learn the particulars of their work, one solution is to harness the
power of practice. Pay attention to the patterns of rewards and
sanctions built into legal practices and devise strategies to take
advantage of the already existing informal controls. Make visible
the norms that lawyers are following in the different areas of
practice and encourage reflection about them. And fully fund legal
services for indigent criminal defendants and low income clients in
94 See Wilkins, supra note 12.
95 See, e.g., New York's Disciplinary Rule 5-111, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.29-a
(1999).
96 AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS, BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (1991).
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civil cases to reduce the power imbalances between lawyer and
client in these areas.
